Eliminative Materialism

Eliminative Materialism is a broad ontological view, though for this entry it will relate specifically to how it is commonly used in regard to the mind-body debate, and the existence of mental states. Eliminative materialists argue that all of our typical mental states that are used in common [folk] psychology talk should be eliminated, as they do not stand for anything physical/material. They are vague, uncertain, and do not refer to anything that is actually occurring. After all, all that is really 'in the mind' is in reality only the processes that are occurring in the brain. So, we do not need any definitions in the dictionary that do not specifically refer to such processes in the brain - thus, we should eliminate talk of mental states and opt for a better language that is more apt to scientific discourse. Eliminative materialists argue that mental states cannot be reduced down to physical processes, which is what has them as the opposite of reductive materialists, but the reason for this isn't because of some dualism, but because such states do not exist! They are terms that only arose from the roots of folk psychology that discussed things like desire or belief without any scientific basis. Other eliminative materialists take a similar view: such mental states that we commonly refer to do refer in some sense to material processes in the brain, but such terms are not language-apt (or more better: science-apt) to properly express what is physically happening. Thus, we should eliminate these words/terms/concepts in favor of a more concise and accurate terminology. Such philosophers argue that, just like the words of 'demons' and 'angels' and 'soul', scientific progress will eventually eliminate any unnecessary or ontologically incorrect terms in favor of a material vocabulary.