Compatibilism

Compatibilism is a position and a [possible] solution in the debate of free will and determinism. While it is sometimes held that free will and a deterministic world cannot exist together, compatibilism believes that these two beliefs are reconcilable, or compatible - more specifically, there can be [moral] responsibility in a deterministic world. There are two main arguments for compatibilism, the first being: free will merely means the ability to do what one wishes without external hindrance. So, as long as you are able to act on your desires or interests (that are determined) without physical barriers - then you have a form of free will, and thus the two concepts are not incoherent together. The second argument critiques a principle that ‘incompatibilists’ use: The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which states that one cannot be held [morally] responsible for an action unless they could have done otherwise. However, compatibilists attempt to argue that this is not necessarily the case and a person can be held responsible for an action even if they could not have done otherwise. The famous thought experiment is (paraphrased): Jones decides to shoot Smith. Black has learned of these plans and wishes for Jones to follow through with it. Though, Black does not want to force Jones to shoot Smith - but, rather, Black arranges things so if, at any moment, Jones wavers in his resolve, Black will cause Jones to fire the gun (assume Black has all these capabilities). As it turns out, Jones doesn’t need convincing and ends up shooting Smith off of his own accord, without Black interfering. This provides a convincing counterexample to the PAP, since it intuitively seems like Jones should be held accountable for his actions even though he was not able to do otherwise (since Black would have gotten involved). Aside from these two arguments for compatibilism - which have had varying degrees of success - the position has considerably grown in recent years - perhaps not explicitly - but intuitively, in a world that seems to require a framework for moral responsibility of will and a determined world.